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Maryland Law Review
VOLUME XXIV

WINTER, 1964

NUMBER 1

SOME AISPECTS OF MARYLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By LONAED E. COHEN*
It should be obvious to every lawyer that the field of
administrative law has expanded rapidly in the recent
past and is continuing to expand at the present time. The
direction in which the field is growing, however, may not
be as obvious; in fact, it may, on occasion, seem that the
growth proceeds in many directions at the same time, some
of them being contradictory. This uncertainty sometimes
stems from decisions within the same jurisdiction which
seem conflicting at first glance. In many instances, such a
conflict can be resolved by close and careful scrutiny of
the particular circumstances of the cases; nevertheless,
some decisions remain puzzling despite the most exact
examination. More often confusion arises because the
courts of different jurisdictions adopt different rules regarding the same type of issue. For instance, the Maryland
rule and the federal rule conflict on several points of
administrative law.'
In an attempt to clarify the situation for Maryland lawyers, this article will provide a general view of Maryland
administrative law by considering various points which
seem to merit special attention. Judge Reuben Oppenheimer published a similar article in 19382 that was of
great benefit to the bench and bar of Maryland, and it is
not the intent of this article to repeat his work. During
the years, however, significant alterations have occurred
in some of the areas which he discussed, new issues have
arisen as the result of more recent decisions, and the pas* A.B. 1953, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1958, Harvard Law
School; Member, Baltimore City Bar; Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Gutberlet
& Conaway.
For example, the right to a hearing when an agency is acting legislatively, as discussed infra, at n. 27, and the application of the doctrine
of res judicata, as discussed infra, at n. 54.
Oppenheimer, Admini8trative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 185
(1938).
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sage of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act' in
1957 has made a fundamental change in the field as a whole.
At this point, it might be well to define "administrative
law". As stated by Judge Oppenheimer, "administrative
law involves the nature of the operations of administrative
agencies, as well as the control exercised by courts over
their creation and activities. '4 The term "administrative
agency" encompasses all government bodies and officials,
excluding the legislature and the judiciary, which exercise
legislative or adjudicatory functions similar to those exercised by the legislature and the judiciary.
THE MARYLAND ADmmvisTRIWE PROCEDURE ACT

The Maryland APA applies to all of the State administrative agencies except those six agencies which are expressly exempted. Its coverage is accomplished by the
following definition of "agency":
"AGENCY

means any State board, commission, de-

partment or officer authorized by law to make rules or
to adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial branches, and except the Department
of Parole and Probation, the State Industrial Accident
Commission, the State Insurance Department of Maryland, the Public Service Commission, the Employment
Security Board and the State Tax Commission." 5
The act may be divided into two main parts, (1) that
dealing with the adoption, publication, and judicial review
of rules, and (2) that dealing with the procedure and judicial review of contested cases. "Rule" 6 and "contested
case" 7 are defined in the first section of the act, and these
definitions must be studied and applied in each matter
arising under the act. As a broad analogy, an agency rule
may be compared with legislation enacted by a legislature,
and a contested case before an agency may be compared
with a judicial trial without a jury. This analogy, however, is greatly over-simplified and is offered only as an aid
to basic understanding, not as a formula for the resolution
of problems in the administrative field. A special word of
caution might prove helpful respecting "contested cases"
84 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 41, §§ 244-56, hereinafter sometimes referred
to as Maryland APA.
ASupra, n. 2, 187.
5
MD. LAws 1963, Ch. 305, § 244(a).
6 Supra, n. 3, § 244(b).
7
Supra, n. 3, § 244(c).
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as defined by the act. To the lawyer accustomed to judicial
trials, "contested case" connotes an adversary as distinguished from an ex parte proceeding. Such a view may be
an erroneous over-simplification. The act provides as
follows:

"CONTESTED

CASE

means a proceeding before an

agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges
of specific parties are required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing."
Under the statutory definition, an agency proceeding is
a "contested case" only when an agency hearing is required
by law or constitutional right. If a hearing is not required
on these grounds, the proceeding presumably would not
be a contested case, and the various provisions of the act
dealing with contested cases would not apply.
Despite the enactment of this statute, the large body of
case law which preceded it still has relevance. As stated
above, six large administrative agencies are exempted from
the act; as to these agencies, therefore, the decisional rules
have been affected only tangentially by its passage. More
important, the act provides only a bare outline of administrative procedure which must be supplemented by judicial
statements concerning proper conduct of agency affairs.
The prior case law is still helpful in filling in the large
statutory gaps.
DELEGATION OF POWER

One of the dramatic developments in the field of administrative law during this century has occurred in connection with the delegation of power from Congress, state
legislatures and municipal legislative bodies to the multitude of administrative agencies which now exist in this
country. As government expanded, legislators realized that
they possessed neither the time nor the technical competence to enact legislation containing the specifics necessary
for the complicated programs being instituted, and it
became their practice to pass a statute or ordinance setting
forth in broad outline the goals to be accomplished and giving to the agency which would administer the legislation
the responsibility for implementing it by means of rules,
regulations and decisions. For many years there was grave
doubt as to whether legislators could constitutionally delegate their responsibility respecting legislation to administrative bodies, which were, of course, not chosen by the
8See infra, at n. 21, for a discussion of the right to a hearing.
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electorate. Over a period of time, however, various judicial
decisions throughout the country, in both the federal and
state jurisdictions, indicated that such a practice would be
constitutional as long as the legislation in question set forth
standards limiting the discretion of the agency and indicating the results desired by the legislature. This trend also
occurred in Maryland. In his article on Maryland administrative law, Judge Oppenheimer discussed the Maryland
cases up to 1938 dealing with the delegation of power and
derived the following principle from them:
"One of the universal rules of administrative law
is that the discretion entrusted to the board or commission to carry out the policy of the legislative body must
be exercised according to reasonably definite standards. * * *
"The phrase 'reasonably definite standards' like the
phrase 'due process of law', takes on meaning only as
it is applied to concrete circumstances. It is a fundamental, although often unexpressed, principle of administrative law, that whether or not standards are
reasonably definite is to be determined, not by abstract
argument, but by scrutiny of the nature of the governmental policy which is to be exercised, the field of
operation and the practical difficulties and results of
regulation in that field."9
As reflected by this statement, into the 1930's the great
concern of the Maryland courts and of the courts in general in this country, in deciding a delegation of power case,
was whether the statute in question contained adequate
standards to guide and limit the discretion of the agency.
This concern is illustrated vividly by a comparison of two
early Maryland cases dealing with this question. Tighe v.
Osborne ° involved a Baltimore City ordinance instructing
the Zoning Commissioner to grant permits for the construction of buildings or for a change in the use of land or
buildings unless he found that the proposed construction or
change of use would create a hazard from fire or disease
or would menace the "public welfare, security, health or
morals". The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because the discretion of the Zoning Commissioner was not limited by reasonably definite standards.
Thereupon, the Baltimore City Council enacted a similar
ordinance but omitted therefrom the words "public wel'Oppenheimer, aupra, n. 2, 199.
"149 Md. 349, 131 A. 801 (1925).
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fare". The Court of Appeals upheld the new ordinance on
the ground that the change in language had sufficiently narrowed the area of discretion delegated to the Zoning
Commissioner."
With the advent of the New Deal, federal legislation
became characterized by extremely broad delegations of
power to administrative agencies coupled with extremely
indefinite standards in the legislation for the guidance and
limitation of the agencies. Although such legislation was
initially jolted by the cases of Panzma Refining Co. v.
Ryan 2 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States," in which the United States Supreme Court held
first part and then all of the National Industrial Recovery
Act to be unconstitutional, the attitude of the Court seemed
to change, with the result that the Court began to uphold
legislation containing standards which were very vague.
For example, the Federal Communications Act gives to the
Federal Communications Commission the enormous power
of licensing radio and television stations throughout the
country and directs the Commission to grant such licenses
"if public convenience, interest, and necessity will be
served thereby". 4 It is submitted that such a standard is
more a matter of form than of substance and that it does
not give the Federal Communications Commission any
meaningful guidance by way of a specific standard in the
performance of its duties.
As such legislative standards became more and more
common, it also became evident that the judicial rule requiring definite standards was being strained to the breaking point. In the federal system, the break occurred with
the Supreme Court's decision in Fahey v. Mallonee," a
case growing out of the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933.
Under this act, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was
given the power to appoint a conservator to take charge of
the affairs of a savings and loan association. However, the
act was completely devoid of standards regulating the
exercise of such power. When shareholders of the Long
Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association sued to enjoin
the Board from appointing a conservator for their association, a three-judge federal district court held the act unconstitutional for the reason that it did not lay down stand" Tighe

v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465 (1926).
"293 U.S. 388 (1935).
See also Friendly, Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need For Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
"295 U.S. 495 (1935).
1447 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1962).
"332 U.S. 245 (1947).
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ards for the appointment of a conservator. The district
court expressly relied on the PanamaRefining and Schechter Poultry cases. The Supreme Court reversed, even
though it recognized the fact that the act did not contain
standards. The Court stated that well-defined practices for
the appointment of conservators had grown out of various
state and federal statutes regulating banking, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had merely followed such
practices. Thus the act was constitutional even in the
absence of explicit standards.
As shown by the Fahey case, the Supreme Court has
become more pragmatic and less theoretical about the requirement of legislative standards. If an agency can be
guided by standards existing outside of legislation, and if a
court can refer to such standards in reviewing the agency's
actions, it seems that a delegation of power without standards in the legislation may be proper.
This type of approach has apparently been adopted to
some extent by the Maryland Court of Appeals. For example, such an approach would explain two cases which
appear to be similar on their facts, but which reached opposite results. In Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan,16 a statute
prohibited the holding of various types of public entertainment in Baltimore City without first paying a fee of
between $5 and $100 as set by the Police Commissioner.
The Court of Appeals held the statute to be invalid because
it did not provide standards to control the Commissioner's
discretion. In Md. Coal Etc. Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 7 a
statute required persons engaged in strip mining to fill in
the land mined so that vegetation could grow on it. The
statute also required such persons to post a performance
bond in an amount between $5,000 and $20,000 as set by
the Director of the Bureau of Mines. The Court of Appeals
upheld the statute even though it contained no standard
for fixing the amount of the bond.
The statutes involved in these two cases have obvious
similarities: both authorize an official to regulate conduct
by choosing a monetary sum from among a wide range of
possible choices, and neither provides a standard to guide
such discretion. However, there are significant practical
distinctions between the two cases which tend to support
the different results. In the Theatrical Corp. case, nothing
in the nature of the various types of public entertainment
would provide meaningful guidance to the Commissioner
or a means of reviewing alleged abuses of his discretion.
180 Md. 377, 24 A. 2d 911 (1942).
11193 Md. 627, 69 A. 2d 471 (1949).
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Also, the difference between a $5 fee and a $100 fee might
well determine the profitability of an enterprise. The
evidence showed, in fact, that the Commissioner had set
the maximum fee for a "walkathon" and for a "dime dance
hall" in order to discourage such enterprises. The opposite
was true in the Md. Coal case. The amount of the bond
was clearly intended to depend on the estimated cost of
filling in the land. Also, the facts showed that the bond
premium would only have varied between $50 and $200,
depending on the amount of the bond required, and neither
sum was likely to be important to the financial success of
a mining operation.
In recent years, the Court of Appeals has gone very
far in upholding delegations of power to administrative
officials in the fields of public health and safety. In Givner
v. Commissioner of Health,' the court stated that in the
field of public health flexible standards are permissible
because the concept of public health is more definite than
that of general welfare and because there is practical
necessity for expert interpretation in concrete situations.
In Pressman v. Barnes, 9 the court went even farther. A
Baltimore City ordinance empowering the Traffic Director
to adopt traffic regulations did not set forth any standards
to guide him. Nevertheless, the court upheld the ordinance,
stating as follows:
"Generally, a statute or ordinance vesting discretion
in administrative officials without fixing any standards
for their guidance is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. But we also hold, as a qualification
of the general rule, that where the discretion to be
exercised relates to police regulations for the protection of public morals, health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without
destroying the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to carry out the legislative will,
legislation delegating such
discretion without such
' ' 20
restrictions may be valid.
The Pressman case illustrates the progression in administrative law from concern with the sufficiency of
statutory standards to inquiring whether any such standards are necessary. As standards with less and less real
substance were upheld by the courts, the ultimate position
Md. 184, 113 A. 2d 899 (1954).
'209
Md. 544, 121 A. 2d 816 (1956).
20
Id., 555.
iS207
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adopted by the Court of Appeals in the Pressman case
became only a question of time. It must still be remembered, however, that the orthodox view requires a definite
statutory standard, except under special circumstances.
NECESsrrY OF A HEARING

One of the continuously perplexing problems of administrative law is deciding whether, in a particular situation,
an agency may act without granting a hearing to interested parties. The word "hearing" often changes meaning
with the context: for example, it may refer to a proceeding
similar to a judicial trial, with testimony, cross-examination and oral argument; it may connote a simpler proceeding, limited to testimony and/or oral argument; it may
even mean a procedure whereby written views are considered in reaching a determination. In general, the word
"hearing" seems to connote at least the presentation of
testimony and argument in some form, however simple.
This problem of what constitutes a hearing has gained
added importance in Maryland with the passage of the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. A large part of
this act applies only to "contested cases", and there is a
contested case only when an agency hearing is "required
by law or constitutional right".
Usually, the right to a hearing derives from the statute
governing the agency in question, either by express provision or by judicial implication; therefore, the word "law"
in the definition of a "contested case" would normally
mean "statute". As an example of a statute expressly providing for an administrative hearing, consider the following provision pertaining to the Maryland Department of
Motor Vehicles:
"Upon refusing or suspending the license of any person as hereinbefore in this section authorized the Department shall immediately notify the applicant or
licensee in writing and upon his request shall afford
him an opportunity for a hearing ... ,
All statutes, however, are not as clear as this one on the
question of the right to a hearing, and, when the statute is
ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to decide the question
of whether a "hearing" must be afforded, with particular
reference to the matters at issue or the parties concerned.
A situation involving a question whether a particular party
16

MD. CODE (1957)

Art. 66%, § 105(e).
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- in this case an intervening party - had a right to a
hearing, occurred in the case of FCC v. National Broadcasting Co.,22 decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Radio stations WHDH in Boston and KOA in Denver operated on the same frequency. When WIHDH applied to the
FCC for an increase in power and for unlimited broadcast
time, KOA petitioned to intervene in the hearing on the
ground that such application, if granted, would interfere
with its signal in the Eastern United States. Section 312
(b) of the Federal Communications Act provided that if
the Commission wanted to modify an existing license, it
must notify the licensee of the proposed action and the
reasons therefor and give the licensee a reasonable opportunity to show why modification should not be ordered.
KOA claimed that this provision gave it a right to participate in the hearing on WHDH's application. The FCC
denied KOA's petition to intervene, but on appeal the
Supreme Court decided, four to two with three abstentions,
that KOA had a right to a hearing, stating:
"A licensee cannot show cause unless it is afforded
opportunity to participate in the hearing, to offer evi' 23
dence, and to exercise the other rights of a party.
It is arguable that the word "law" in the above definition of "contested case" should be interpreted to have a
broader meaning than "statute" even though "statute"
would be the normal meaning. For instance, assume that
the statute governing an administrative agency does not
require a hearing on a given matter but that the agency,
pursuant to the powers delegated to it under the statute,
promulgates its own regulations providing for a hearing.
Since an agency is generally bound by its own regulations,
and since an administrative regulation validly issued under
statutory authority normally has the force of law, 24 it
could be said that in such a situation an agency hearing
is "required by law" within the meaning of the above
definition. If this view is adopted, it would mean that an
agency could theoretically make itself subject to the "contested cases" provisions of the Maryland APA in cases
where it otherwise would not be.
"Contested case" is also defined to include a proceeding
in which an agency hearing is required by "constitutional
right". This phrase is probably used because there may be
-319 U.S. 239 (1943).
Supra, n. 22, 246.
Vitareli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
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situations where the statute in question does not require
a hearing, but where the state or federal constitution
requires one as a matter of due process of law. The leading
case on this point is Londoner v. City and County of Denver,25 decided in 1908 by the United States Supreme Court.
Denver had placed an assessment for the cost of paving a
street on the property abutting the street. The city clerk
had published a notice of the proposed assessment, stating
that the city council would hear written complaints, if filed
within thirty days, before it passed an ordinance assessing
the cost. However, no hearing in the usual sense was
afforded to the property owners involved. The United
States Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the
due process clause of the federal constitution, stating:
"Many requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in proceedings of this
nature. But even here a hearing in its very essence
demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the
right to support his allegations by argument however
brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal."2 6
Thus it may be held in the future, under the principles of
the Londoner decision, that the federal constitution requires a Maryland administrative agency in a given situation to grant interested parties a hearing even though the
applicable Maryland statute does not provide for one. Such
a case would seem to be a "contested case" within the
meaning of the Maryland APA.
As illustrated by the Supreme Court cases discussed
above, the right to a hearing in a given case is often a
difficult question in the federal judicial system, involving
the consideration of subtle distinctions and particular
factual situations. It almost seems that every federal
"hearing" case falls into the large gray area between a
seldom seen black and an equally elusive white. The Maryland decisions on this topic, on the other hand, appear to
be governed by a suspiciously well-defined set of hornbook rules. For example, the Court of Appeals has said
that there is no constitutional right to a hearing where the
agency in question is acting legislatively as opposed to
judicially or where the issue before the agency involves a
privilege as opposed to a right. These rules, however, seem
to gloss over the very difficult questions of what is meant
by "privilege" and by "acting legislatively". Also, they do
-210 U.S. 373 (1908).
U.S. 33 (1950).
1 Supra, n. 25, 386.

See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
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not seem to address themselves to the underlying considerations which should enter into a decision whether or not
an administrative hearing should be granted as a matter
of constitutional right.
The state of the law in Maryland on this issue is well
illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Albert v. Pub. Serv. Commission. One hundred taxicab
drivers applied to the Public Service Commission for permits to operate their own taxicabs in Baltimore City.
The Commission refused to act on their applications on the
ground that a prior study made by it showed that there
was no need for additional taxicabs in Baltimore City.
The applicants then petitioned the Commission for a hearing to show that there was such a need. When the Commission denied them a hearing, they petitioned in court
for a writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to grant
them a hearing. The Court of Appeals decided, inter alia,
that there was no right to a hearing, the court setting forth
four main grounds to support this decision: (1) the statute
did not require a hearing on an application for a permit
although it expressly required a hearing for the suspension or revocation of a permit; (2) the denial of a hearing
was not unconstitutional because the Commission was acting in a legislative capacity, and due process requires a
hearing only when an agency is acting judicially; (3) there
was no constitutional right to a hearing because a taxicab
permit is a privilege, and, therefore, no vested rights of
liberty or property were involved; and (4) the statute
provided for an appeal from the Commission's action, and
where the due process question is close, the availability of
judicial review indicates that no hearing is required.
This reasoning is certainly open to question. The first
point - that the statute did not require a hearing appears valid as a matter of legislative intent. It does not,
however, settle the constitutional point, for as shown by
Londoner," the United States Supreme Court has held that
under some circumstances due process requires a hearing
regardless of statutory provisions. For this reason, the
Court of Appeals was forced to discuss the constitutional
issue.
Its second point - that due process did not require a
hearing because the Commission was acting legislatively
seems to be an over-simplification. The court was apparently assuming that because a legislature is usually not
required to grant hearings, and because a court usually is,
-209
28

Md. 27, 120 A. 2d 346 (1956).

Supra, n. 25.
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it follows that an agency must grant a hearing when it is
acting judicially but not when it is acting legislatively. The
court then concluded that the granting or withholding of
a permit was legislative action which did not require a
hearing. There are two doubtful aspects to the court's
position on this point. First, it is arguable that the action
of the Commission was not legislative. The court stated
that one test of legislative action is whether "there is laid
down a rule of future action which affects a group, and not
the direct application of policy or discretion to a specific
individual". 29 If the court were concerned with the action
of the Commission in arriving at a policy decision not to
issue any new permits, its characterization of such action
as legislative seems proper under the aforementioned test.
However, the court might have been saying that any time
an agency passes on an application for a permit, it is acting
"legislatively". Such a view of the court's position would
be supported by its statement that "the granting or withholding of a franchise or license under the standards prescribed by the legislature is legislation by delegation."" °
It would seem, however, that in considering an application
for a permit, an agency often does not act "legislatively"
under the test enunciated by the court. In making its decision, the agency must often apply broad rules to facts
peculiar to the applicant, a process more akin to the general
concept of adjudication than to legislation. In fact, the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act defines adjudication to include licensing."
More important, it is arguable that the right to a hearing should not be made to depend upon whether agency
action is considered legislative or adjudicative. It does
not necessarily follow that because legislatures do not have
to conduct hearings on prospective legislation, agencies
should enjoy a similar exemption. An agency acting legislatively is different from a legislature in several important respects. Its members are not elected and, therefore,
are probably not as responsive to public sentiment. Also,
the very purpose of quasi-legislative administrative agencies is to carry out functions in a manner which would be
impossible for a legislature. Such agencies are expected to
become expert about limited segments of our society and
2 Supra, n. 27, 36-37.
10Supra, n. 27, 36.
n5 U.S.C. § 1001(d) (1946): "'Order' means the whole or any part
of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule making
but including licensing. 'Adjudication' means agency process for the formulation of an order."
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thus to regulate those segments with a knowledge not
possessed by a legislature, which must devote its attention
to society as a whole. There may be many instances where
a quasi-legislative administrative agency would best perform its duties by affording a hearing to interested parties.
The United States Supreme Court held in the Londoner
case82 that the city, in assessing a tax for the cost of paving
a street, was required by due process to afford a hearing
to the owners of land abutting the street. It seems beyond
argument that assessing taxes would be "legislation" rather
than "adjudication" as those terms are generally understood.
On the other hand, an administrative agency acting in
a judicial manner should not be required to grant a hearing
merely because courts normally do so. Agencies have
means of deciding an issue which courts do not have investigatory and technical staffs to ascertain facts and
analyze materials, and experts to give opinions based on
such research. Since courts must wait for the facts to be
presented to them, the judicial system is naturally predicated upon hearings. Agencies, however, can aggressively
seek facts and might, therefore, be able to perform their
functions properly without a hearing in some instances.
A sensible approach to cases of this type would be to
ignore whether an agency is acting "legislatively" or "judicially", but to ask whether a hearing seems warranted
under the particular circumstances. In deciding this question, it would be important to know whether the party requesting the hearing has sufficient interest in the pending
case and can contribute significantly to a proper result.
Also, the group involved in the matter may be too large to
permit an effective hearing. A question affecting all the
residents of a state, for instance, would probably not lend
itself to a hearing.
This view is illustrated by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
8 8 which should be compared
State Board of Equalization,
with the Court's decision in the Londoner case only seven
years before. In the Bi-Metallic case, the state board increased the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by
forty per cent without granting a hearing to property
owners. Relying on the earlier Londoner decision, one
property owner claimed that the action of the board violated due process. The Court, however, distinguished the
82Supra, n. 25.
-3239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Londoner case on the basis that there a small number of
people were concerned, who were exceptionally affected
by the assessments on individual grounds. Mr. Justice
Holmes stated in the opinion:
"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have
a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does
not require all public acts to be done in town meeting
or an assembly of the whole." 4
Considering the second point in Albert v. Pub. Serv.
Commission on a practical basis, the holding of the court
that no hearing was required seems correct. The one hundred applicants did have a real interest in the matter, and
a hearing could probably have been conducted practically
by limiting testimony to that of representatives of the
group. But it is not clear that such testimony, or even
argument, would have helped significantly in the decision
of the case. The Public Service Commission had recently
completed a study of the problem and had concluded that,
in the public interest, no additional taxicab permits should
be granted in Baltimore City. Facts peculiar to the individual applicants were irrelevant, as were their individual opinions. Expert testimony would not be required
since the Commission itself is deemed to be expert in
such matters. What purpose would have been served in
conducting a hearing?
To test this practical approach, assume that the Commission denies an application for a taxicab permit because
the applicant is of bad moral character. Should the Commission be able to refuse him a hearing on the ground
that it is acting legislatively? Is it not clear that the
facts peculiar to him should be determinative of the case
and that he would probably be the primary source of
such facts?
The Maryland Court of Appeals' third point in the
Albert case - that no vested right was involved because
a taxicab permit is a privilege - has probably been
weakened by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States. In a long line of cases, the Supreme
Court has held that government employment constitutes
a right rather than a privilege.3 5 Even more directly in
point, the Court has held that there is a right to practice
"Supra,

n. 33, 445.
See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).

and Slochower
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law8 6 and engineering 7 which cannot be taken away without due process of law. The practice of a profession such
as law or engineering can be distinguished from other
types of employment, such as driving a taxicab, because
of the great investment of time and money necessary to
qualify for such a profession. The same distinction, however, would not apply to government employment in general. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Supreme Court
would recognize a constitutional distinction between the
right to hold a government job or to practice a profession
and the right to drive a taxicab.
The fourth point in Albert - that the right to judicial
review may show that no agency hearing is required does not seem supported by the practicalities of the situation. Judicial review is, of course, always important to
prevent arbitrary administrative action, but every lawyer
realizes that the vital part of any case is to compile a
favorable record below rather than to rely upon appellate argument. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals
suggests that the applicants could have presented evidence
on appeal, if an applicant is going to present evidence at
some stage during litigation of this type, it seems sensible
for him to do so before the Commission passes on his
application, rather than to wait for an appeal to the court.
EVMENCE IN THE REcoRD

Agencies generally adjudicate cases in a more informal
manner than courts. The absence of juries, the assumed
expertness of the members of the agency as regards the
subject matter before them, the desire for expeditious
handling of cases, and frequently the absence of counsel
representing the parties, all contribute toward the elimination of the technical rules of evidence and procedure found
in a courtroom. Nevertheless, an agency must follow rules
of practice which afford fair treatment to parties appearing before it. One of the basic requirements of fair procedure is that an agency's decision should be based upon
the evidence produced at the hearing before the agency.
There are two obvious reasons for this. First, a party
would be unduly prejudiced if an agency based its decision on evidence outside of the record which he had no
mKonigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957). This decision
is particularly significant in that it involved a refusal to grant a license,
thus refuting the commonly heard generalization that although there may
be a right involved in the revocation or suspension of an existing license,
no right is involved in the refusal to grant a license.
87 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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opportunity to rebut or explain. Also, a court cannot intelligently review agency action based on evidence not
contained in the record. These principles are followed
as a matter of course in judicial procedures, and it may
be surprising to many people that they pose any problem
in the administrative field. Difficulty does arise, however,
because of the inherent differences between administrative agencies and courts. Many agencies possess technical
and investigating staffs which may be prone to supplement an agency record with evidence gathered as a result of their independent efforts. Also, many agencies maintain extensive files containing detailed material respecting the parties falling within their jurisdiction. This is
especially true of regulatory agencies which receive periodic reports from parties under their control. It is tempting for an agency in an adjudication involving such a
party to examine its own files in a search for information in addition to that produced at the hearing.
The tendency of some agencies to base their decisions
on evidence outside of the record has resulted in several
United States Supreme Court decisions holding that such
a practice is unconstitutional as a denial of due process
of law. For example, in United States & I.C.C. v. Abilene
8 the Interstate
& Southern Railway Co.3
Commerce Commission decided a rate making case by referring to the
annual reports of the carriers involved filed with the Commisison, without giving the parties an opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence thus obtained. In setting aside
the Commisison's order, the Court stated:
"The objection to the use of the data contained in
the annual reports is not lack of authenticity or untrustworthiness. It is that the carriers were left without notice of the evidence with which they were, in
fact, confronted, as later disclosed by the finding made.
The requirement that in an adversary proceeding
specific reference be made, is essential to the preservation of the substantial rights of the parties.""
There are several decisions of the Maryland Court of
Appeals which follow the Supreme Court's rule that an
agency's decision must be based on the record before it.
In Dembeck v. Shipbuilding Corp.,40 the State Industrial
Accident Commission held a hearing to determine the ex- 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
- Id., 289.
- 166 Md. 21, 170 A. 158 (1934).
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tent of a claimant's disability. After the hearing, the
doctor who served as the Commission's medical advisor
examined the claimant and submitted his report to the
Commission. Although the Commission included the report in the record, the claimant was not given the opportunity to interrogate the doctor regarding the report.
The Court of Appeals held that the Commission had acted
improperly by denying the claimant an opportunity to
confront the witness.
Duncan v. McNitt Coal Co."' involved a similar issue,
but the Court of Appeals refused to follow the Dembeck
case. An employee filed a claim under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for disability allegedly caused by silicosis. Pursuant to the statutory procedure for claims involving an occupational disease, a hearing was held before the Medical Board. At the hearing, the only witnesses were the claimant and his doctor, who testified
that the claimant had silicosis. There was also in evidence X-rays of the claimant and the report by his doctor
of tests made on him. The Medical Board found that
the claimant did not suffer from silicosis, but from heart
disease unrelated to his occupation, which finding was
affirmed by the State Industrial Accident Commission. The
Court of Appeals upheld this finding despite the claimant's
contention that there was no expert testimony in the
record to support such a conclusion. The court stated that
although administrative bodies may not rest their decisions
on matters of private knowledge not in the record, the
Medical Board could apply its expert knowledge to the
medical evidence before it.
There is some similarity between the Dembeck and
Duncan cases - in both cases the Commission based its
decision on the opinions of doctors assigned to it despite
the fact that the claimants had no opportunity to examine them respecting their decisions. The different results in the two cases, however, seem justified by important differences in the facts. In the Dembeck case,
the extra-record evidence furnished through the examination by the Commission doctor concerned basic facts regarding the claimant's physical condition, that is, the primary medical data necessary for an expert opinion. The
claimant might have been able to explain or contradict
certain of this data and thus obtain a decision in his
favor. Conversely, the Medical Board in the Duncan case
merely pronounced its opinion based on the medical data
- 212 Md. 386, 129 A. 2d 523 (1957).
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which the claimant had introduced in evidence. Its expert knowledge was properly used to evaluate facts in the
record rather than to add material to the record.
The cases are distinguishable on yet another ground.
In the Duncan case, the claimant had the opportunity to
argue against the Medical Board's opinion at a subsequent hearing before the Commission. He was apprised
of the Board's position and had the opportunity to prepare
an answer. The claimant in the Dembeck case had no such
opportunity since the Commission received the doctor's
report without giving the claimant a chance to rebut
it.
The issue of evidence outside of the record was also
42
discussed by the Court of Appeals in Bosley v. Quigley,
although the point did not determine the result. This
case involved the question whether additional bus service
was needed over a particular route. After the close of
a hearing conducted by it, but before its decision, the
Public Service Commission sent several members of its
staff to observe the existing bus service. Relying to some
extent on the report of such members, the Commission
found that the existing service was adequate. The Court
of Appeals rebuked the Commission for considering such
extra-record evidence in the following language:
"Of course, the Commission being a quasi judicial
tribunal must act solely on the evidence before it,
and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but not offered in evidence.''"
On the point of evidence in the record, the Maryland
Administrative Procedure Act follows the philosophy of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 44 which in turn
adopts the judicial rules discussed above. The Maryland
APA requires all evidence considered in the determination of a case, including records and documents in the
possession of the agency, to be offered and made a part
of the record. However, agencies may take notice of
judicially cognizable facts and of general, technical, or
scientific facts within their specialized knowledge, provided that the parties are notified either before or during
the hearing, or by reference in a preliminary report or
otherwise, of the material so noticed and are afforded an
opportunity to contest it.4 5
189 Md. 493, 56 A. 2d 835 (1948).
SId., 508.
"5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1946).
454 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 41, §§ 252(b) and (d).
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Just as an agency is generally not permitted to base
its decision on evidence outside of the record, it is also
not permitted to decide issues without any evidence in
the record to support its decision. For instance, an agency
cannot merely hold that given action would be in the
public interest in the absence of basic facts showing that
the public interest would be served. This principle is
illustrated by Heath v. M. and C.C. of Baltimore,4 6 in
which a property owner applied for a special exception
permitting him to erect a two-car garage in the rear of
his apartment house. When the Building Engineer dis-.
approved the application, the property owner appealed to
the Board of Zoning Appeals. On the date set for a public hearing, no one appeared before the Board except the
property owner. The Board thereupon passed a resolution stating merely that it had "made a study of the
premises and neighborhood" and approved the application.
Shortly thereafter, neighboring residents petitioned in
court to have the order of the Board set aside, and the
Court of Appeals held that the resolution of the Board
should be reversed. Under the Zoning Ordinance, the
Board had to take into consideration all pertinent factors,
such as fire hazards, traffic problems, transportation requirements and facilities, streets and pavings, schools,
parks, and playgrounds, in passing on an application for
a special exception. In this case, the Board announced
merely that it had "made a study of the premises and
neighborhood", and there was no supporting evidence upon
which to base a rational judgment. The Court of Appeals
concluded that it was arbitrary and unlawful for the
Board to make an essential finding without supporting
evidence.
The Maryland APA contains several provisions designed
to require agencies to support their decisions by findings
of fact based upon evidence in the record. Every decision or order of an agency in a contested case must be
accompanied by findings of fact consisting of a concise
statement of the conclusions upon each contested issue
of fact.4 7 Also, a reviewing court may reverse an agency
decision which is unsupported by competent, material and
substantial evidence in view of the entire record, or which
is against the weight of such evidence. 8
It is interesting to note that the act requires an agency
decision to be supported by "competent" evidence. The
- 187 Md. 296, 49 A. 2d 799 (1946).
Supra, n. 45, § 254.
"Supra, n. 45, § 255(g).
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term "competent" in this context normally means admissible under the legal rules of evidence. For many years,
there has been an unsettled question in the administrative law field whether an agency decision based entirely
upon legally incompetent evidence should be upheld. 9 In
the federal sphere, there are many conflicting decisions
on this point, most of them dealing with the problem
of hearsay.50 Some states have adopted the so-called "residuum rule", which requires the presence of some competent evidence supporting an agency's decision, in addition to any incompetent evidence. 5 Maryland decisions
do not seem to have followed the residuum rule in the
past, 2 but it is arguable that the act has introduced this
rule into the state by requiring agency decisions to be
supported by competent evidence.
Assuming that the act has made this change, it does
not follow that legally incompetent evidence may not be
introduced and relied upon in agency proceedings. The
act itself provides that "agencies may admit and give
probative effect to evidence which possesses probative
value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent men
in the conduct of their affairs."55 At most, the act would
seem to require the existence of some competent evidence after all other evidence is ignored, a requirement
similar to that of the residuum rule.
RES JUDICATA AND REoPENING

The question of the application of the doctrine of res
judicata to administrative agencies has been the subject
of much scholarly writing," and it is not the intent of
this article to repeat such discussions. Nevertheless, as
background for the Maryland law on this point, it might
prove helpful to provide a broad outline of the general
authority on the question.
The general rule is that the doctrine, which arose in
connection with judicial decisions, does not apply to administrative action of a legislative nature5 5 Further, it
"For a thorough discussion of this topic, see 2 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, §§ 14.01-14.17 (1958).
102 DAVIS, Op. Cit. supra, n. 49, §§ 14.11-14.12.
2 DAVIS, op. cit. 8upra, n. 49, §§ 14.10-14.12.
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 185,
205-208 (1938).
534
MD. CODE (1957) Art. 41, § 252(a). This language is based on the
statement of Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Remington
Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938).
5,See, e.g., 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra, n. 49, §§ 18.01-18.12.
5Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 284
U.S. 370 (1932) ; 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra, n. 49, § 18.08.
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is sometimes said that the doctrine does not even apply
to administrative action of a judicial nature since res
judicata is relevant only to courts.5" Many writers take
issue with this latter view and suggest that courts should
invoke the doctrine in a proper case and that often they
do invoke it in substance if not in form. 7 The United
States Supreme Court, for example, refused to allow the
Interstate Commerce Commission to order a railroad to
pay reparations to a shipper on account of unreasonable
rate charges when the Commission some years earlier
had approved the rates as reasonable. In so ruling, the
Court nevertheless stated that the Commission was not
bound by the rule of res judicata.8 There is also some
question whether the order of a court reviewing administrative action becomes res judicata as to the agency even
though the agency would not be bound by its own decision in the absence of judicial review.5 9 In Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,0 the United States Supreme Court gave res judicata effect to an agency finding,
which had been upheld by a federal court, without discussing whether the court order or the agency decision
caused the rule to be invoked. Thus the case could stand
for one of two propositions: that res judicata applies to
agency decisions; or that the rule applies to such decisions only when enforced by order of court.
The basic problem created by these cases is whether
the rule of res judicata should be ignored merely because
an administrative agency rather than a court is involved.
Res judicata basically is a rule originated by the judiciary
for the efficient administration of justice, premised upon
the desire for the termination of litigation at some point.
Certainly, this desire seems relevant to litigation before
administrative bodies, many of which function like courts
and have jurisdiction over important rights and interests.
It may require as much, or more, time and effort to try
a case before an administrative body, such as the Public
Service Commission, as before a court. Also, the absence
of the principle of res judicatain the administrative sphere
For example, in Churchill Tabernacle v. F.C.C., 160 F. 2d 244, 246
(D.C. Cir. 1947), the court said that there is a "well settled doctrine
that res judicata and equitable estoppel do not ordinarily apply to decisions of administrative tribunals."

§ 18.02; STASON
510-514 (1957); JAFFE

2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra, n. 49,

ADMINISTRATIVE TIsuNALs,
MINIsTRATIvE LAW, 410-415
as Arizona Grocery Co. v.

LAW
AND CooPE,
AND NATHANSON,

OF

AD-

(1961).
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra,

n. 55.
192 DAVIs, op. cit. supra, n. 49, § 18.11.
D310 U.S. 381 (1940).
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could result in the costly defeat of actions or expectations based on a prior decision.
There is, of course, one distinction between judicial
and administrative adjudications which lends support to
the orthodox view. In general, the public has a greater
interest in administrative proceedings, which often affect
persons besides the parties themselves, than in judicial
proceedings, which usually affect only the litigants. This
distinction tends to show that the principle of res judicata
should not be applied as freely to administrative action
where such application would prejudice the public interest by perpetuating a decision which was initially
wrong or which had become outdated.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has apparently settled
the question in this state in accordance with the orthodox view that res judicata does not apply to administrative decisions. The Maryland rule of res judicata is clearly
illustrated by the case of Knox v. City of Baltimore.21
The owner of property located in an area zoned residential had been using a garage on his property to store
tools. Claiming a non-conforming use of his property,
he applied for a permit to enlarge the garage. After a
hearing, the Board of Zoning Appeals found a non-conforming use and approved the application. However, when
the owner failed to exercise the permit within six months
as required by the ordinance, the permit expired. The
next year, he again applied for the same type of permit, but this time, after another hearing which was more
thorough than the first one, the Board found no nonconforming use and refused to grant the permit. The
owner contended that the first ruling of the Board was
res judicata on the issue of the non-conforming use. In
upholding the Board's action, the Court of Appeals held
that, since the Board was not a judicial tribunal, its
first ruling could not be considered res judicata.
The Knox case was followed in Dal Maso v. County
Commrs.,12 where property owners applied for the rezoning of their property from residential to commercial.
After a public hearing, the County Commissioners approved the rezoning. One week later, upon the requests
of residents in the area, the Commissioners rescinded the
order and scheduled a rehearing the following month.
Before the rehearing took place, the owners petitioned
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioners to
reinstate the original order. Citing the Knox case, the
1i80 Md. 88, 23 A. 2d 15 (1941), noted, 6 Md. L. Rev. 256 (1942).
182 Md. 200, 34 A. 2d 464 (1943).
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Court of Appeals held that the order was not res judicata
since the Commissioners were not a judicial body. It also
held that boards and agencies to which legislative power
has been delegated can change any of their rules affecting persons who have not acquired vested rights. In this
case, the owners had not changed their status during
the week when the order was in effect.
The Dal Maso case seems to go beyond the Knox case
by indicating that, although res judicata does not apply
to administrative agencies, an agency may be prevented
from changing a decision if a party has acquired vested
rights therein. There is the further suggestion that a party
may acquire vested rights by changing his status in reliance on a decision. Thus, the Court of Appeals may
be willing to employ an estoppel-type of approach in cases
of this sort even though it has thus far rejected the traditional res judicata approach.
The issue in the Dal Maso case was actually different
from, although related to, the issue in the Knox case.
The Dal Maso case involved the right of an administrative body to reopen a decision, while the Knox case involved the right of such a body to change in a later
case a finding made by it in an earlier case. In the
judicial context, there would be the same difference between the question when a decision becomes final and
the question whether a court is bound by a final decision
in a prior case.
Subsequent Court of Appeals cases have viewed the
Dal Maso case as one concerning reopening rather than
63
res judicata. In Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney,
the court held that the Zoning Board of Baltimore City
could not reopen a decision in the absence of fraud, mistake, surprise or inadvertence, even though the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance contained no provision to
this effect. The court reasoned that such a restriction
could be implied from the nature of the Board as a quasi64
judicial body. In Kay Const. Co. v. County Council,
the Montgomery County Council acting legislatively first
granted an application for rezoning and then, upon reconsideration, denied it. The applicable zoning ordinance
permitted reconsideration "for good cause shown", which
language the court interpreted to incorporate the test laid
down in the McKinney case for the reopening of a quasijudicial decision. The court then held that the reconsideration was improper in that the only reason therefor was
174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938).
6227 Md. 479, 177 A. 2d 694 (1962).
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an alleged error of judgment and there was no showing
of fraud, surprise, mistake or inadvertence. Recently, the
court again relied on the McKinney test in striking down
a reconsideration by the Montgomery County Planning
Board respecting an application for a subdivision. 5
In summarizing the effects of these decisions, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals has held that an administrative agency may not reopen its decision, in the absence of fraud, surprise, mistake or inadvertence, where
the agency is acting as a quasi-judicial body, or where
it is acting legislatively and the governing statute requires good cause for reconsideration. The Dal Maso case,
however, held that where an agency is acting legislatively, and the governing statute does not require good
cause for reconsideration, the agency may reopen a decision as it sees fit as long as vested rights are not affected.
As a concluding thought on the issues of res judicata
and reopening, there should be considered a possible difficulty that might arise as a result of the similarity of
the principles but the different treatment accorded them
by the Court of Appeals. Res judicata refers to the relitigation of a claim or an issue settled in a previous case;
it does not bind administrative agencies. Reopening refers to reconsideration of a claim or an issue settled in
the same case; certain agencies may not reopen a case
in the absence of fraud, surprise, mistake or inadvertence.
What would happen if the losing party before such an
agency files a new petition, seeking identical relief,
promptly after the denial of his first petition? Which
doctrine is called into play - res judicata or reopening?
Should the second petition be considered tantamount to
a petition for reconsideration? Would the period of time
between petitions be important? Regarding this last question, the United States Supreme Court permitted the Interstate Commerce Commission to reopen a case two years
after its decision.6 The answers to the questions remain
for the future and the Court of Appeals.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The problem of primary jurisdiction, which has caused
great confusion in the federal courts, was handled with
apparently little trouble by the Maryland Court of
Appeals when the problem was presented to it. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, stated simply, is that, when
ISchultze v. Montgomery Co. Bd., 230 Md. 76, 185 A. 2d 502 (1962).
"Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939).
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a court and an agency seem to have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter within the area of the agency's
special interest, the court should defer to the agency at
the initial stage of the proceedings. 7 This enables the
agency to apply its special knowledge, often referred to
as "expertise", to the matter and gives a reviewing court
the benefit of the agency's findings. 8 Also, channeling
all cases of a given type to a particular agency is supposed to result in a uniformity of decision which might
not occur if various courts or juries decided the issues.
In some cases, however, the only disputed issue may be
one of law; a court may then feel that it is as capable,
if not more capable, than the agency to resolve such an
issue. Where there is only an issue of law to be decided, there has been great uncertainty regarding the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the
federal sphere.
The federal problem is clearly illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co.69 The case grew out of the practice of
conferences of international steamship companies to charge
lower freight rates to shippers who agreed to use member companies exclusively. In an earlier case, the United
States had brought an anti-trust suit in a federal district court against another shipping conference maintaining such a practice. The Supreme Court had held that
the suit should be dismissed on the ground that the matter fell within the primary jurisdiction of the Federal
Maritime Board.70 In Isbrandtsen,the Board had approved
a similar rate structure of a different conference on the
ground that it was necessary to offset the effect of nonconference competition. The Supreme Court held that such
approval was improper in that the conference system of
rate-setting was a violation of the Federal Shipping Act.
Two Justices dissented, stating that the earlier decision
had implied that such a rate structure would be lawful if approved by the Board. Otherwise, they argued,
wLeading cases on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) and Great Northern
Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
recent years, several of the leading writers on administrative law
8 In
have questioned the reality of the presumed expertness of administrative agencies. The backgrounds of many of the members of boards and
commissions, and the rapid turnover of such members, lends some support to this view. See, e.g., Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, The
Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577 (1954); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954).
356 U.S. 481 (1958).
7OFar East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
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there was no sense in holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction over the matter. If the Board could
not lawfully uphold the system, the Court might just
as well have decided the legal question in the first instance.
A similar situation was presented to the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Cambridge v. Eastern, etc., Co."' The
Commissioners of Cambridge claimed that they had statutory authority to distribute electric power in Cambridge;
the Eastern Shore Public Service Company, however,
claimed that it had an exclusive franchise to carry on
such activity. The Commissioners brought a suit for a
declaratory judgment, desiring a resolution of the question before they applied to the Public Service Commission for a certificate authorizing them to distribute power.
It would have cost them a great deal for surveys and
other expenses in connection with such an application.
The Company demurred on the ground that prior resort
to the Public Service Commission was required. It contended that the Commission had extensive records pertaining to its operations and that, therefore, trial of the
issue before the Commission would be more convenient.
The Court of Appeals held that prior resort to the Commission was not required, stating that the extent of a
franchise is a question of law, or of mixed fact and
law, completely subject to review by the judiciary. Declaratory relief would result in a judicial determination
of the question which could guide the parties and the
Commission.
The manner in which the Court of Appeals handled
this case seems to provide an efficient method for cases
of this type. It obviates the necessity for parties to spend
the time and effort to try such a case before an agency
only to find that the case is governed by a purely legal
issue which a court can resolve more expeditiously than
the agency. Since the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is based chiefly on practical as opposed to technically
legal considerations, it seems appropriate that the courts
should be practical in applying it.
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

There have been a number of Maryland cases dealing with the question of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and, although the rules set forth in these cases
can be expressed simply, they are often difficult to apply.
- 192 Md. 333, 64 A. 2d 151 (1949).
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The basic rule is that a party who desires a clarification of his rights under a statute, or who seeks relief
from administrative action pursuant to a statute, must
follow the avenue of relief provided by the statute in
question. For example, assume that someone who wants
to obtain a driver's license alleges that the regulations
governing the issuance of licenses would improperly prohibit him from obtaining one. In order to test his rights,
he would normally have to apply for a license and argue
his case before the officials of the Department of Motor
Vehicles. He could not by-pass the Department by simply
suing in court for a resolution of the question. Similarly,
a party should not sue in court to reverse the action of
a lower official of an agency when the statute provides
for an appeal to a higher official of that agency. Also,
he should not appeal from an agency to one particular
court when the statute requires him to file his appeal
in a different court.
In approaching any case of this type, the first thing
to consider is whether there is any effective statutory
remedy available to the party in question; if there is
none, no problem of exhaustion of remedies arises. Although this point seems obvious, in some instances it
becomes very subtle. As an illustration, consider the
case of County Commis. of A. A. Co. v. Buch. 2 A taxpayer filed a petition with the County Commissioners of
Anne Arundel County for a hearing concerning the undervaluation of assessments on property of other taxpayers
in the county. When the Commissioners denied his petition on the ground that all property in the County had
been or was being reassessed, he petitioned in court for
a writ of mandamus requiring the Commissioners to afford him a hearing. A statute expressly granted the right
to such a hearing; it also provided that a taxpayer aggrieved because of a refusal or failure to make a change
in an assessment could appeal to the State Tax Commission. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner
had not failed to exhaust his statutory remedies by seeking relief from the court rather than from the State Tax
Commission since the refusal to grant the hearing was
not the same as a refusal to change an assessment. Rather,
it was a refusal to consider whether a new valuation was
in order. Supporting this view, the court noted that the
State Tax Commission did not seem to have the authority
to grant the relief which the taxpayer would have de- 190 Md. 394, 58 A. 2d 672 (1948).
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sired on appeal to it. The Commission did not have express authority to remand a case to the County Commissioners for a hearing. If the Commission itself held a
hearing, it would be exercising original jurisdiction rather
than appellate jurisdiction as contemplated by the statute.
7
Contrast this decision with that in the Albert case, 3
where the Public Service Commission had refused to
act on applications for taxicab permits and had later refused to grant a hearing on such refusal. The applicable
statute permitted an appeal from the Commission's refusal to grant the permits. However, instead of employing this method of relief, the applicants sought a writ
of mandamus requiring the Commission to grant them
a hearing. The Court of Appeals held that mandamus
would not lie because the applicants had not exhausted
their administrative remedies.
Although the court did not refer to the Buch case in
its opinion in the Albert case, the two cases are surprisingly similar if it is assumed that the applicants in Albert
had a right to a hearing. Following this assumption, it
appears that in both cases mandamus was sought not
to obtain the ultimate relief desired, but to obtain a
hearing which, it was hoped, would lead to such relief.
The taxpayer in the Buch case ultimately wanted various
assessments to be raised. The applicants in the Alpert
case ultimately wanted taxicab permits. Why, then, did
the court hold that mandamus was properly sought in
one case but not in the other?
Since the court did not compare the two cases, it
is impossible to answer the question with any certainty.
In the Buch case, the court stressed the fact that the Commissioners had refused to consider the merits of a revaluation, but had not refused to change an assesment.
This distinction was said to make the statutory appeal
provisions inapplicable. It may be argued that such a
distinction is more verbal than meaningful. It would not
be difficult to hold that a refusal to set in motion the
proceedings requisite to a change of assessments is in
effect a refusal to change assessments. Would it not be
just as meaningful to say that the Commission in the
Albert case had not denied the applications but had, as it in
fact did, merely refused to pass on the applications on the
ground that it was not then considering the issuance of
additional permits?
" 209 Md. 27, 120 A. 2d 346 (1956).
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It is possible to distinguish these two cases on a more
substantial ground. If the taxpayer in the Buch case
had appealed to the State Tax Commission, he would
have requested the Commission to remand the case for a
hearing or to hold a hearing itself. However, as the
court noted, it is not clear that the Commission had
authority to do either. Thus, the statutory appeal might
not have been effective. Conversely, in the Albert case,
the statutory procedure appeared to be effective since
the court would probably have remanded the case for a
hearing if one had been required.
The purpose behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is clear and laudable - efficient administration of agencies and efficient review of agency action require parties to follow statutory procedures rather than
to improvise according to their whims. There are occasions, however, when circumstances seem to require a
relaxation of the rule to some extent. The Maryland
Court of Appeals has recognized two broad exceptions
to the rule. First, a court of equity may hear a case
involving a constitutional question without requiring an
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Second, if an
agency requires a person to follow an unauthorized procedure, he may sue 7in
4 court to force the agency to adopt
a proper procedure.
The first exception regarding constitutional questions
is often stated by the court as if it were inflexible, but
on occasion, the court has indicated that it would be
proper for a court of equity to require the exhaustion
of remedies even in a case involving a constitutional question. As an example of the orthodox statement of the
rule, consider the following formulation by the Court of
Appeals in Schneider v. Pullen:
"Appellant has a special interest in bringing this
proceeding because he is engaged in the business of
operating a trade school, and therefore must, under
the terms of the statute, obtain a permit. He does
not have to apply for this permit, and then, if it
is refused, take the various appeals outlined in the
statute, in order to raise the constitutional question
'In Shpak v. Mytych, 231 Md. 414, 418, 190 A. 2d 777 (1963), the
Court of Appeals stated that exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine "only apply where the act of the administrative agency is alleged to be unconstitutional, ultra vires or illegal and may injuriously
affect the rights and property of the claimant." Although this language
might imply a broadening of the exceptions recognized under prior decisions, the citation in the opinion of such prior decisions suggests that
no broadening was intended.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

of the validity of the act as a whole. That has been
raised by a proceeding in equity in many cases....
The appellant had the undoubted right to raise the
questions he does as to the constitutionality of
the
statute by means of the bill in equity he filed." 75
In the same year, the Court of Appeals restated the
rule in Kracke v. Weinberg, but this time the "right"
mentioned above seemed to be converted into a privilege
which a court of equity would grant reluctantly:
"It has been, of course, well settled that where a
constitutional question is involved, equity may intervene and enjoin action by an administrative body,
although this is not favored where there are statutory
remedies which permit the raising of such a question. 7 6
In fact, the Court of Appeals has required resort to
an agency in a case involving a constitutional question.
This case, Bogley v. Barber,77 is discussed more fully below, and the court's action can, perhaps, be explained
on another ground. Nevertheless, the following language
respecting the constitutional question is still significant:
"In the instant case it is not suggested that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional except (if at all)
if and as applied to appellant's property. We see
no reason why in the instant case the pending proceedings before the Council should be halted by injunction and
the whole controversy taken over by
7'
the court. 1
An examination of the Maryland decisions dealing with
the constitutional exception question thus reveals that at
first glance many of the cases seem inconsistent. In order
to discuss this apparent inconsistency, it will be helpful
to consider three cases which fairly represent the decisions of this type. All three cases involve situations where
a party sought judicial relief without first presenting the
problem to an administrative agency which had jurisdiction over the matter. The action of the Court of Appeals was substantially different in each case.
- 198 Md. 64, 69, 81 A. 2d 226 (1951). This view was reaffirmed recently in Richmark Realty v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A. 2d 196 (1961).
-0197 Md. 339, 343, 79 A. 2d 387 (1951).
- 194 Md. 632, 72 A. 2d 17 (1950).
Id., 640.
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Kahl v. Cons. Gas El. Lt. & Pwr. Co. 79 involved a
bill to enjoin the Gas Company from constructing an
overhead power transmission line through Baltimore
County to its Mt. Washington sub-station. For such construction, a recently adopted zoning regulation of Baltimore County required a special permit which was to
be granted only when such lines could be carried over
head without impairing the public health, safety or general welfare. The Company did not apply for such a
special permit, contending that the zoning regulation was
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the
zoning regulation was valid, having real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety and welfare. However, the court would not consider the right of the Company under the zoning regulation to construct the line
in question since the Company had not applied for a
special permit and thus had not exhausted its administrative remedies.
In Kracke v. Weinberg owners of unimproved land
brought a suit for a declaratory decree to test the validity
of an ordinance zoning their property residential. The
court noted that the owners could have judicially tested
the validity of the ordinance in a statutory appeal following an application to build upon the land in question.
However, it held that they did not have to wait until
they were ready to build on their land before obtaining
a determination of their right to use it for other than
residential purposes. On the merits, the court held that
this land could not be used practically for residential
purposes, and that, therefore, respecting this property, the
ordinance amounted to an unlawful taking of property
without compensation.
In Bogley v. Barber,"' the County Commissioners of
Montgomery County, after a hearing on the matter,
granted the application of a property owner for a reclassification of his property from residential to commercial. Thereafter, certain neighboring property owners filed
with the County Council (successor to the County Commissioners) an application for reversal of the action reclassifying the property. Before the Council had passed
on the application the property owner filed a bill to enjoin the Council from reversing the action of its predecessor. The property owner claimed that he had a constitutional right in the existing zoning of his property by
-191 Md. 249, 60 A. 2d 754 (1948).
-197 Md. 339, 79 A. 2d 387 (1951),
1Supra, n. 77.

noted, 13 Md. L. Rev. 242 (1953).
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virtue of his reliance on the commercial zoning. The Court
of Appeals held that it was not required to decide the
question of his alleged vested interest. It stated that in
this case the action sought to be enjoined was action
feared but not yet taken. The court concluded that there
was no reason to enjoin the pending proceedings before
the Council and have the whole controversy taken over
by a court.
The variations in the handling of these cases by the
Court of Appeals is interesting. In the Kahl case, the
court determined the constitutionality of the zoning regulation but refused to apply the regulation to the facts
of the case, holding that the zoning officials should do
so upon application for a special permit. In the Kracke
case, the court did apply the zoning ordinance to the
facts of the case and held that the ordinance was unconstitutional regarding the particular property involved.
In the Bogley case, the court refused to consider, before
the County Council had passed on the question, the property owner's constitutional argument that he had a vested
interest in the existing zoning of his property.
Why did the court in the Kahl case determine the
constitutionality of the regulation but refuse to apply
it? Why did the court resolve the issue of fact, or of
mixed law and fact, in the Kracke case when it refused
to resolve similar issues in the Kahl and Bogley cases?
There are two ways to approach an answer to these questions: first, by analyzing these cases on the basis of the
applicability of the constitutional question exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies; second, by viewing the cases strictly from a practical standpoint.
Using the first approach, there is a clear distinction
between the two issues in the Kahl case which might
explain the difference in treatment. The Company contended that the regulation was unconstitutional; it did
not seem to allege that the application of the regulation
to it was also unconstitutional. Thus, pursuant to the
constitutional question exception, the court was obliged
only to determine the constitutionality of the regulation.
The absence of any contention that the application of the
regulation would be unconstitutional also distinguishes the
application issue in the Kahl case from such issue in the
Kracke case. In the latter case the contention was that
the application of the zoning ordinance would be an unconstitutional taking of property. Since this contention
raised a constitutional question, the court did not require
resort to the zoning officials.
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The constitutional question approach, however, seemingly fails to distinguish the Kracke case from the Bogley
case. In Bogley the property owner was similarly contending that any change in the zoning classification of
his property would be unconstitutional because he had a
vested interest in the existing zoning. Nevertheless, the
court refused to apply the constitutional question exception and held that his suit should be dismissed. Perhaps, the court's action resulted from its belief that the
constitutional issue was really not substantial. In discussing the vested right contention, the court stated:
".... intentional destruction of a building of value
in preparation for rebuilding would present a serious
question. But permitting destruction of property by
vandals is an odd way to create property rights. A
vested right so created would seem as frail as the
house was."8 2
The second approach to these cases, one which seems
fundamentally sounder than the approach just employed,
emphasizes the practical aspects in either granting or refusing permission to by-pass an administrative agency.
The reason why the court was willing to determine the
constitutionality of the regulation in the Kahl case was
probably that it is senseless to litigate a case in a lengthy
administrative hearing only to find that the governing
legislation is unconstitutional. The facts of the case developed at the hearing would be unnecessary to the determination of the validity of the legislation. On the other
hand, if the issue in the case concerns the application of
legislation, and therefore the particular facts must be developed and considered, it would make sense to try the
case before the agency having jurisdiction over the matter. Either a court or the agency must conduct a hearing, and it seems that the agency should be preferred
since the legislature gave it jurisdiction for that purpose.
This assumes, of course, that it is possible to raise the
issue before the agency. If it is not, then the only practical way of resolving the issue would be by a suit in
court.
Applying these principles to the cases under discussion,
it is possible to explain why the court might have decided to determine the application issue in the Kracke
case but not in the Kahl and Bogley cases. In all three
cases the issue would have required detailed considera- Id., 639.
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tion of the facts, indicating that the agency involved
normally would be the proper tribunal to decide the issues initially. In both the Kahl and Bogley cases, it was
also apparent that the issue could have been presented to
the agency without undue delay. The Gas Company in
the Kahl case could have applied for a special permit,
which it clearly wanted, and thereby have raised the issue of its right to one under the regulation. The property
owner in the Bogley case could have argued the issue of
his vested right at the hearing before the County Council.
On the other hand, the property owners in the Kracke
case did not have a practical way of raising the issue
without suing in court. Although they had the right to
apply for a building permit, this would have been a meaningless gesture since they had no intention of building on
their land.
The second exception to the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine recognized by the Court of Appeals is that if
an agency requires a person to follow an unauthorized
procedure, he may sue in court to force the agency to
adopt a proper procedure. This exception certainly makes
sense in a situation where a party would be required
to follow a lengthy procedure unnecessarily. On the other
hand, trivial procedural errors might warrant invocation
of the de minimus doctrine so that courts would not be
burdened with inconsequential suits. The difficult situations, as usual, are those which fall in the broad area between these poles.
The court referred to the second exception in Stark
v. Board of Registration,8 although it did not apply the
exception on the merits of the case. Under the statute
for the registration of professional engineers, the Board
of Registration was instructed to issue certificates without oral or written examination to professional engineers
who had performed work of a character satisfactory to
the Board. An engineer applied for a certificate, but the
Board required him to submit further evidence of his
practical experience before it would grant his application.
The applicant felt that the evidence of his experience
which he had already submitted was sufficient to support
his application. He, therefore, petitioned for a writ of
mandamus compelling the Board to issue to him a certificate of registration as a professional engineer. The statute
provided that any person aggrieved by any action of the
Board could appeal to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City or to the Circuit Court for any county. The Court
- 179 Md. 276, 19 A. 2d 716 (1941).
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of Appeals held that the petition was improperly brought
since there was a statutory proceeding available for review and the statutory method had not been followed.
The court noted that if an agency pursues a method contrary to statute, or sets up unauthorized standards of qualification, then mandamus will lie to compel the observance
of the law. However, in this case, all that the Board asked
the applicant to do was to supply evidence that he had
performed work of a satisfactory character, as required
by the act. Therefore, there was no evidence that the
Board had acted arbitrarily in a manner at variance with
the statute.
METHODS OF REvmw

The preceding discussion of exhaustion of administrative remedies should have made one point clear - when
the applicable statute provides for an effective appeal
from administrative action, this avenue of relief must be
followed.8 4 Suppose, however, that the statute is silent
regarding such an appeal. Under such circumstances, may
a court review administrative action at all? If it may,
what procedure should an aggrieved party follow to obtain judicial review?
The absence of a statutory provision for judicial review of administrative action may be construed to mean
that the legislature desired the agency's decision to be
final and free from review by the courts. There are federal cases where courts have held that under such circumstances administrative action was not reviewable by
the judiciary. 5 Such a construction, however, would allow an agency, created by the legislature, to act unchecked
by the judiciary and would thus appear to conflict with
the basic principles of separation of powers and checks
and balances. For this reason, many federal cases have
allowed judicial review in cases of this type to correct
arbitrary administrative action.8 6 The Maryland Court
"IChapter 1100, Subtitle B of the Maryland Rules of Procedure now
provides for a uniform method of taking an appeal from an administrative agency to a court. This method applies only where the statute
involved authorizes judicial review; thus the rules do not by themselves
give a right to appeal. Kone v. Baltimore County, 231 Md. 466, 190 A.
2d 800 (1963). This method supplants the particular forms of proceeding in the various statutes, except that mandamus is governed by
Subtitle BF of Chapter 1100.
'E.g.,
Switchman's Union of North America v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) ; A.F.L. v. N.L.R.B., 308 U.S. 401 (1940). But
cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
"E.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). In Stark v. Wickard,
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of Appeals has taken a very firm position on this issue,
holding that under the state constitution the legislature
cannot completely preclude judicial review:
".. . The legislature is without authority to divest
the judicial branch of the government of its inherent
power to review actions of administrative boards
shown to be arbitrary, illegal or capricious, and to
impair personal or property rights; but the courts are
likewise without authority to interfere with any exercise of the legislative prerogative within constitutional limits, or with the lawful
' ' Texercise of administrative authority or discretion.
This statement shows that Maryland courts will review allegedly arbitrary agency action even though the
applicable statute does not provide a procedure for appeal. The question remains, however, what procedure
should be followed in such a situation to obtain judicial
review. In some states the procedural choice is difficult
because of rules concerning the use of various writs.
Fortunately, the Maryland lawyer does not have to concern himself with such intricacies since the Maryland
forms of action are relatively clear-cut. Where the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act applies,8 8 the act permits the institution of proceedings for judicial review by
the filing of a "petition" in the proper court."9 The term
"petition" is not defined in any manner and is not connected by reference with the common law forms of action. Thus, the act eliminates the requirement of filing
any particular type of writ and employs a simple petition for review. Where the act does not apply, review
may normally be obtained by proceedings for mandamus,
injunction, habeas corpus or declaratory judgment, depending, of course, upon the type of relief desired. The procedural questions surrounding the use of these forms of
action are the same in the administrative law field as
in other branches of the law, and will not be discussed
here. One point, however, should perhaps be noted. The
321 U.S. 288, 307 (1944), the Supreme Court said: "There is no direct
judicial review granted by this statute for these proceedings. The authority for a judicial examination of the validity of the Secretary's action is found in the existence of courts and the intent of Congress
as deduced from the statutes and precedents as hereinafter considered."
Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A. 2d 73 (1945).
SIt must be remembered that the judicial review provisions of the
act only apply where: (1) the agency involved is covered by the act;
(2) the matter involved is a "contested case" as defined in the act.
14 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 41, § 255(b).
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Court of Appeals has mentioned repeatedly the familiar
doctrine that mandamus will not lie to review discretionary
action by administrative officers unless such action is arbitrary and an abuse of power.90 Viewing the situation practically, this doctrine could probably be expanded to say
that usually no form of action will be effective to obtain
review of such discretionary action, because, on the merits,
a court will generally not reverse decisions of administrative officers properly within their discretion. 91
There are two leading Maryland cases illustrating judicial review of agency decisions when the statute in question is silent. Both involved the Board of Trustees of
the Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore City. In
Hecht v. Crook,92 a member of the Appeals Tax Court
of Baltimore City was not reappointed to this office when
his term expired. Under the governing ordinance, he was
entitled to a pension only if he had been "removed" from
office. When the Board refused to approve his application for a pension, he sought a writ of mandamus requiring the Board to grant him a pension. The Court of
Appeals held that the decision of the Board was subject
to judicial review even though the ordinance did not provide for such review. It stressed the points that the
Board's decision was based purely on its interpretation
of the ordinance and that such questions of law, which
do not involve discretion, are normally for the court. On
the merits, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the
Board's decision.
In Heaps v. Cobb,9 the Chief Engineer of Baltimore
City died in an automobile accident while driving to work.
Although the city provided him with a car, on this occasion he was using his own car. All of the testimony
before the Board indicated that he had died as a result
of the accident. Nevertheless, the Board denied his widow's
application for benefits on the ground that he had died
as a result of a heart attack rather than from the accident. As an additional basis for its decision, the Board
found that his death had not occurred during the course
of his employment. The widow then sought mandamus
to require the Board to approve her application, and the
Court of Appeals ruled in her favor on two grounds: (1)
the Board's finding that the decedent had died as a re10See, e.g., District Heights v. County Comrs., 210 Md. 142, 122 A. 2d
486 (1956) ; Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 40 A. 2d 673 (1945).
" Supra, n. 90.
9
Ibid.
- 185 Md. 372, 45 A. 2d 73 (1945).
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sult of a heart attack was arbitrary in that there was
no evidence to support such a finding; and (2) as a matter of law, driving to work was in the course of his employment because the city furnished a car for such purpose.
It is interesting to note that the issues reviewed in
these two cases represent the different types of issues
which generally arise in litigation. The question in the
Hecht case regarding the interpretation of the word "removed" in the ordinance would normally be considered
a question of law. In the Heaps case, the scope of employment issue seems to be one of mixed law and fact,
while the cause of death issue appears clearly to be one
of fact. These cases indicate, therefore, that the availability of the various forms of action in cases of this
type is generally not affected by the kind of question involved.
JUDICIAL REvIEw OF EVIDENCE

A. Substantial Evidence Rule
The availability of judicial review of administrative
action does not necessarily mean that a court will treat
an appeal from an agency as if it were an appeal from
a lower court. It is said to be the general practice of
courts, when reviewing a decision of an administrative
agency, to uphold the agency's findings of fact unless they
are arbitrary. This practice is often referred to as the
"substantial evidence rule", meaning that an agency's findings of fact will be upheld as long as there is some reliable evidence in the record to support such findings, even
though the weight of the evidence is to the contrary. To
give a simple illustration of the rule, assume that in an
agency hearing five witnesses testify on one side of a
proposition, and one witness testifies on the other. In its
findings, the agency states that it does not doubt the
credibility of any of the witnesses, but that it is relying
on the testimony of the one witness and disregarding that
of the five. Under the substantial evidence rule, a court
would be required to uphold such findings. Although this
rule applies with greatest force to pure questions of fact,
courts sometimes employ it respecting the application of
the law to the facts, i.e., what is usually referred to as
mixed questions of law and fact. 9 4 This attitude differs
from that of a court reviewing the findings of a lower
"For example, in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504
(1951), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not have
reversed a Deputy Commissioner's determination that an employee's death
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court, in which case the reviewing court will normally
take more liberty in reversing findings of fact.9 5 This
practice has resulted from the belief that administrative
agencies have special knowledge and experience which
better enables them to decide questions, often technical,
falling within their jurisdiction."
The Maryland Court of Appeals consistently adhered
to this philosophy of reviewing agency action in cases
decided prior to the passage of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. After reviewing the Maryland cases
on this topic, Judge Oppenheimer concluded:
"In no other phase of the subject has the liberal
attitude of the Court of Appeals been more marked
than in the much mooted matter of the scope of judicial review. The position of the Court has been consistent; it will not substitute its own judgment on
the facts for the finding of the administrative agency."9 7
However, the act appears to enlarge the scope of judicial
review of facts in appeals from agency action. Section
255 (g) (6) provides that a court may reverse or modify
a decision if the administrative findings are "against the
weight of competent, material, and substantial evidence
in view of the entire record, as submitted by the agency
and including de novo evidence taken in open court".9
As a result of this section, it will seemingly no longer
be enough, in cases where the act applies, that administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Such findings presumably will still be upheld when the
evidence is so neatly balanced that there is equal support
arose out of his employment even though his determination clearly involved a mixed question of law and fact and the point could have been
decided either way on the facts.
'Appellate courts in reviewing the factual findings of trial courts are
bound by the "clearly erroneous test". As stated by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) :
"['Judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have the
statutory or constitutional limitations on judicial review of findings
by administrative agencies or by a jury...
A finding is 'clearly
erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
"Consider, for example, the following statement of the Supreme Court
in the leading case, Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 49
(1954):
"'One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards
is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular
statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation
of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration'...."
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 185,
208-209 (1938).
84 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 41, § 255(g) (6).
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for differing conclusions. 9 When there is a preponderance
of the evidence favoring a single conclusion, it would
seem that under the above-quoted language, the agency
must find in accordance with that conclusion.
The Maryland Court of Appeals discussed the change
in judicial review of agency findings brought about by
the act in Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm.,10 0 the first
appeal to the Court of Appeals under the act. The Real
Estate Commission of Maryland suspended the licenses
of two real estate brokers after finding that they had
engaged in unethical conduct. After reviewing the evidence, the court held that the Commission's findings of
fact and conclusions of law were supported by competent,
material and substantial evidence in the entire record and
were not overcome by countervailing evidence. In reaching its decision, the court considered the effect of the new
act and indicated that, although the function of reviewing courts is now broader than before, the change was
not intended to be drastic:
"While it appears that the scope of judicial review
by a trial court of the findings, inferences, conclusions
and decisions of administrative agencies under the
statute has been broadened to some extent, it is clear
that the statute did not intend that the court should
substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from
which the appeal is taken."'' 1
In a subsequent decision, Board v. Oak Hill Farms,02
the Court of Appeals seems to suggest that as a practical
matter, the act did not actually change the scope of judicial review, even though the language of the act would
seem to indicate a change. In that case, the governing
statute (which applied to Prince George's County) permitted the reviewing court to reverse the County Commissioners, acting as a District Council, if their decision
was "against the weight of competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record". This
language is identical to the corresponding language in
the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, quoted above.
Construing this language, the court reviewed the history
"'See N.L.R.B. v. Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 106 (1942),
where the Supreme Oourt said: "The possibility of drawing either of
two inconsistent inferences from the evidence did not prevent the Board
from drawing one of them, as the court below seems to have thought."
10221 Md. 221, 156 A. 2d 657 (1959).
101Id., 230.

232 Md. 274, 192 A. 2d 761 (1963).
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of the substantial evidence rule and concluded that "the
line between the test of substantiality of evidence on the
whole record and that of the weight of the evidence is
thin and difficult to delineate."' 3 The court also stated
as follows:
"Whether the test of substantial evidence on the
entire record or the test of against the weight of
all the evidence is followed, the courts have exercised restraint so as not to substitute their judgments
for that of the agency and not to choose between
equally permissible inferences or make independent
determinations of fact, because to do so would be
exercising a non-judicial role. Rather, they have attempted to decide whether a reasoning mind could
reasonably have reached the result the agency reached
upon a fair consideration
of the fact picture painted
4
by the entire record.' 10
In reaching these conclusions, the court reasoned that
under the substantial evidence rule, the whole record
must be considered in order to determine whether the
evidence supporting an agency's decision is substantial,
and whatever in the record detracts from the weight of
such evidence must be taken into account. This, the court
said, emphasized the fact that there is a thin line between
a test based on substantial evidence and one based on
weight of the evidence.
On the facts of the Oak Hill Farms case, this reasoning
is understandable in that there was practically no evidence to support the decision of the County Commissioners. The decision would have been reversible under
either of the two tests. The question remains, however,
whether the court will also equate the substantial evidence rule with the weight of the evidence rule in a
case where the result could depend on which test is
employed. To explain, first assume a set of facts similar
to those in the Oak Hill Farms case. There are one hundred pieces of evidence in favor of proposition I and only
one piece of evidence in favor of proposition II. Although
there would be evidence supporting proposition II, it would
clearly not be substantial evidence, considering the evidence to the contrary. Also, the weight of the evidence
would clearly be in favor of proposition I. Next assume
that five pieces of evidence favor proposition I and one
piece of evidence favors proposition II. This is similar
1w!Id., 283.

10

Ibid.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIV

to the illustration given at the beginning of this section.
It would seem that, even taking into account the contrary evidence, there would be substantial evidence supporting proposition II, assuming that the one piece of evidence is of a reliable nature. Nevertheless, it would also
seem that the weight of the evidence is against proposition II. In this type of situation, the test employed would
probably be determinative. If under these circumstances
the Court of Appeals still equates the substantial evidence
test with the weight of the evidence test, it would be
ignoring the fact that the leading writers in the field
of administrative law have recognized
a meaningful differ10 5
ence between the two tests.
0 6 stated
The Court of Appeals in State Board v. Ruth"
that, on questions of the scope of judicial review, the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act takes precedence
over a concurrent statute also granting judicial review.
In the Ruth case, an appeal from the agency's action was
permitted by both the Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors Law 10 7 and the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. The trial judge concluded that since appeal
was available under the Professional Engineers Law, the
scope of judicial review was broader than in the case of
an appeal permitted solely by the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary,
stating that by virtue of the enacting legislation, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are controlling
in the event of any inconsistency between that act and
other statutes.
B. Independent Judicial Review
One important case decided by the Maryland Court of
Appeals involved the issue whether a court, in reviewing
an administrative determination of a constitutional fact,
should refuse to give any weight to the finding of the
administrative agency. The background for the issue was
a series of United States Supreme Court decisions which
are landmarks in administrative law. In Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,10 8 a company contended that
rates set for it by the Public Service Commission of
1014 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 29.08, p. 153 (1958); Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1028-29 (1956). See, e.g.,
G. H. Miller & 0o. v. United States, 260 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959) ; General Foods Corp. v. ,Brannan, 170 F. 2d 220
(7th Cir. 1948) ; Manlowe Transfer & D. Co. v. Department of P. Service, 18
W. 2d 754, 140 P. 2d' 287 (1943).
' 223 Md. 428, 165 A. 2d 145 (1960).
1'77 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75Y2, § 18(d).
10253 U.S. 287 (1920).
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Pennsylvania were so low as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court held that due process required the Pennsylvania court, in reviewing the order alleged to be unconstitutional, to exercise an independent judgment regarding the law and the facts - that is, the court must
not consider itself bound by the findings of the agency.
In Ng Fung Ho v. White, 10 9 the Supreme Court held in
a deportation case that a claim of American citizenship
supported by evidence raised an essential jurisdictional
fact which the reviewing federal court must determine
independently. In Crowell v. Benson,"0 the issue was
whether an employee's accident was covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The
Supreme Court held that this issue raised constitutional
and jurisdictional questions and that, therefore, the federal court reviewing the agency action should determine
independently questions of law and fact. In addition, the
Court held that the reviewing court should compile its
own record as a basis for decision. In St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States,"' involving allegedly confiscatory rates set by a federal agency, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the above line of decisions but noted that in
exercising its independent judgment, a federal court could
give appropriate weight to the agency findings.
The problem of these cases was presented to the Maryland Court of Appeals in Beckett v. Housing Authority."2
Residents and taxpayers of Baltimore City sought an injunction against the construction of certain public housing projects by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City.
The statute provided that the Housing Authority could
rent or lease the housing only to persons of low income.
The Housing Authority employed a technical and statistical staff which assisted it in determining what persons
should be admitted to these housing units. After a study
of the data gathered by this staff, the Housing Authority
set up a schedule of income limits for families.
The suit was based upon the contention that the determination by the Housing Authority as to who were
persons of low income was arbitrary because it allowed
occupancy of low rent projects to persons who had incomes up to $2950 per year. The plaintiffs claimed that
it would violate the state and federal constitutions for
a statute to provide for housing with public funds for persons not of low income. They therefore contended that
-259 U.S. 276 (1922).
"°285 U.S. 22 (1932).
m298 U.S. 38 (1936).
I198
Md. 71, 81 A. 2d 215 (1951).
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the Housing Authority's determination as to who were
persons of low income involved a constitutional fact, and
that the reviewing court had to hear and determine the
facts independently.
The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, holding
that the public utility rate cases and cases involving civil
and personal rights relied on by the plaintiffs were not
applicable where, as in this case, the plaintiffs had no
direct, personal or property rights involved. The plaintiffs were suing as taxpayers only. The court then stated
that the question was whether or not the Housing Authority had acted arbitrarily in fixing income limits. It
noted that the Housing Authority had a staff of technical
and statistical experts, whereas a court did not, and that,
therefore, the finding of the Authority should not be disturbed where there appeared to be substantial evidence
to support it. The court concluded that, on the facts,
it would sustain the income schedule determined by the
Housing Authority, however broad or narrow the scope of
judicial review.
This case actually involved two separate points: (1)
whether the Maryland courts are required by the Fourteenth Amendment to determine independently issues of
constitutional fact when it is contended that an agency
has acted unconstitutionally; and (2) whether the Maryland courts should review such findings independently as
a matter of their own judicial policy. On the first point,
it does seem meaningful to distinguish the federal cases
on the ground that in the Beckett case no personal rights
were involved. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibition,
which was the basis for decision in the Ben Avon case,
concerns only the deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. Since the only interest claimed
by the plaintiffs was that of taxpayers, with no greater
rights than any other taxpayers, their plea for independent
judicial review was not as strong as that of the Company
in the Ben Avon case or of the aggrieved parties in the
other cases discussed above. By analogy, the Supreme
Court has held that a general federal taxpayer has no
standing in court to attack a federal appropriation."' On
the second point, however, such a distinction does not
seem as meaningful. Assuming that it is a court's policy
to review independently a case of this type when it involves personal rights, such a policy might also apply
when the case involves alleged unconstitutional action affecting an entire community. Improper expenditure of
m Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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millions of dollars of public funds, as alleged in the
Beckett case, would appear to warrant at least as much
judicial attention as an unlawfully low rate set for a public
utility.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals may be indicating that it will not follow the philosophy of the Ben
Avon case and similar decisions as a matter of general
policy.'1 4 This philosophy has been greatly criticized by
writers in the administrative law field, 1 5 and it appears
to have been ignored in recent federal decisions." 6 The
criticism has focused upon the impracticability of expecting a reviewing court to examine a lengthy administrative record and perhaps to compile its own record in
order to make independent findings about extremely complicated and technical issues. The Court of Appeals appeared to be in sympathy with such criticism when it
emphasized the fact that the Housing Authority had a
staff of experts but the reviewing court did not. In addition, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether
or not the challenged findings involve jurisdictional or constitutional facts requiring independent judicial review. Almost any administrative decision contains findings which,
if analyzed unreasonably closely, could be made to raise
jurisdictional or constitutional questions by an attenuated
process of reasoning.
The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act provisions
dealing with the scope of judicial review are rather broad,
but they do not require independent judicial review. They
seem, however, to infer that an agency's decision should
be upheld if it is supported by competent, material and
substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION

The various aspects of administrative law discussed
above do not even approach a complete review of this
vast area of the law. The reader is cautioned, therefore,
that this article must be supplemented by his own research
before he can begin to feel familiar with Maryland administrative law in general. Also, it should be remembered
that administrative law is a fast growing, continually
fluctuating field in which the decision or rule of today
may become obsolete within a few years.
Il The Court of Appeals has consistently refused to follow such cases.
See Oppenheimer, supra, n. 97, 209-210.
15See, e.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953 (1957).
I'l See, e.g., Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. F.P.C., 179 F. 2d 179 (3d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950) ; Cities Service Gas. Co. v.
F.P.C., 155 F. 2d 694 (10th Cir., 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).

